26 December 2007

Why I'm not interested in scepticism

As far as I understand it, a lot of modern epistemological philosophy is occupied with scepticism: since we could be completely mistaken in what we think we know, how can we secure any kind of knowledge at all?

Descartes roped in God to rescue knowledge. Bertrand Russell relied on logical atomism founded on sense data. The younger Wittgenstein realised this couldn't work and went for full-throttle logical atomism. Since then we've had a number of attempts to establish certainty in one way or another - I remember reading a paper about tennis results that was supposed to be a big leap forward in understanding. It confused me even more.

I'm afraid I'm with the guys who say the problem itself is misconceived. I think there's something fundamentally peculiar about the idea that I could be completely, systematically mistaken about what I know.

Some anti-sceptical arguments seem to be driven by the intuition that we must have knowledge, therefore the sceptical scenario must be mistaken. I don't think this intuition has much weight: if the Demon is out there, I can't have knowledge - not in the Cartesian sense, because this demands that knowledge is unassailable.

There may be unassailable knowledge, but my feeling is that even if we could figure out what this is, there would still be serious inadequacies in the Cartesian understanding of knowledge. The problem is Cartesians make knowing such a hard thing to do that we have to conclude that knowing is almost impossible.

Knowledge must be possible - in fact, it must be easily obtainable - because we use the words "know" and "knowledge" perfectly successfully all the time. So I think any theory of knowledge that says there is no such thing as knowledge - that in the majority of cases when we say "we know" we are are in fact mistaken - can't really have the knowledge thing nailed down.

I take it that the knowledge problem is actually more subtle (and therefore interesting, ahem) than the modern anglophone treatment might lead me to believe. There is knowledge - what is mysterious is what it is to be a "knowing being". It has something to do with power and intellectual integrity, and this is what I want to talk about.

By-the-by, I've heard that Foucault runs a very good discussion in The Order of Things about how the modern debate about scepticism is misconceived and doomed to failure. I've not got around to reading this yet, but it has something to do with Descartes and modern philosophers having different understandings of the self but not realising it so their arguments talk past each other. What we need to do in order to understand knowledge is somehow unite these two conceptions of the self, rather than give one priority over the other.

Gutting's article about Foucault in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is pretty good - he knows what he's talking about (not so much on power/knowledge, but on the more classical philosophical problems he's dead good).

2 comments:

bblfish said...

Perfectly right. Of course we know a whole bunch of things. Any argument that shows that we can't know anything has a misguided concept of knowledge.

This is Robert Nozick's argument which I summarize in a note to my post on possible worlds:

http://blogs.sun.com/bblfish/entry/the_fifth_dimension

Nozick's definition of knowledge manages to get around the problem that the possibility of our being completely wrong about everything affects our claims to knowledge. Knowledge is tracking the truth in the closest possible worlds. Other possible worlds don't affect our knowledge claims.

Paul said...

Not quite what I was trying to get at - my beef extends from scepticism to Nozick. It seems to me that any line of thought that starts "well, I'd better not define knowledge so the Evil Demon can get me" starts out with a misunderstanding of the problem. I'll have a pop at Nozick later.